The paper is concerned with the dependence of the solution of the deterministic mean field game on the initial distribution of players. The main object of study is the mapping which assigns to the initial time and the initial distribution of players the set of expected rewards of the representative player corresponding to solutions of mean field game. This mapping can be regarded as a value multifunction. We obtain the sufficient condition for a multifunction to be a value multifunction. It states that if a multifunction is viable with respect to the dynamics generated by the original mean field game, then it is a value multifunction. Furthermore, the infinitesimal variant of this condition is derived.
Introduction
The theory of mean field games aims to study noncooperative dynamical games of a large number similar players. The main idea of this approach is to examine the limit case when the number of players tends to infinity and each player becomes negligible.
The concept of mean field games was proposed by Lasry, Lions [26] , [27] , [28] and by Huang, Caines, Malhamé [20] , [21] . Nowadays, there are several approaches to the mean field game theory. First one reduces the mean field game to the backwardforward system of fully-coupled nonlinear PDEs. The first equation is the HamiltonJacobi equation which describes the value function of the representative player. The second equation is the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation and it characterizes the distribution of all players. Within the framework of this approach the existence and uniqueness problems for mean field games were studied (see [19] , [22] , [27] , [28] , and reference therein). Moreover, one can construct an approximate Nash equilibrium for the finite player game given a solution of the mean field game [22] , [29] .
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The second approach to the mean filed games is called probabilistic. It involves the study of infinite player dynamical game with similar players and mean field interaction among them. The probabilistic approach considers the solution of mean field game as the symmetric Nash equilibrium in this game (see [10] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [24] ). This allows to prove that the open-loop equilibria of finite players games converge to the solution of mean field game when the number of players tends to infinity [16] , [25] .
The third approach is concerned with the study of the partial differential equation involving the derivatives in the space of probabilities called the master equation. It was proposed by Lions in his seminal lectures [29] (see also [8] ). The master equation encapsulates the necessary information to describe the solution of mean field game. It is used to establish the convergence of feedback equilibia of finite player games to a solution of mean field game a nondegenerate stochastic game [9] . Moreover, Lions noticed that the classical mean field game system is the characteristic system of the master equation. The master equation was discussed in [6] , [7] , [11] . Note that in [11] the master equation was formally derived using the dynamic programming arguments applied to the optimization problem for the representative player. In [23] approximate equilibria in the finite player game with exogenous noise were constructed based on the solution of the mean field game with common noise.
Nowadays, the existence theorem for the master equation is obtained for the case of nondegenerate stochastic mean field games (possibly, with common noise) satisfying Lasry-Lions monotonicity condition [9] . The proof is based on the fact that the usual mean field game system provides characteristics for the master equation. Furthermore, the short-term existence theorem is proved in [13] and [17] .
The master equation in particular describes the dependence of the solution to the mean field game on the initial distribution of players. In the paper we examine this dependence in the viewpoint of the probabilistic approach. The study is based on the viability theory arguments (see [2] , [3] ).
We restrict our attention to the deterministic mean field game. Moreover, for simplicity, we assume the periodic boundary conditions i.e. the phase space for each player is the d-dimensional torus
Recall that within the framework of the probabilistic approach the study of the deterministic mean field game is reduced to the study of the symmetric of equilibrium of the continuum player game where the dynamics of each agent is d dt x(t) = f (t, x(t), m(t), u(t, x(t))).
Here m(t) is a probability on T d describing the distribution of all players at time t, t ∈ [0, T ], x(t) ∈ T d , u(t, x(t)) ∈ U, U is a control space. We assume that the each player aims to maximize his/her payoff given by σ(x(T ), m(T )) + T t 0 g(t, x(t), m(t), u(t, x(t)))dt.
To present the main objective of the paper let us consider the finite player game analogy. If one examine the N player non-cooperative differential game with weakly coupled dynamics of agents, then the state space is (T d ) N , while the players' outcome is a N-dimensional vector. In this finite player game the value function (multifunction) is the mapping which assigns to each initial position the set of Nash values.
Turning to the continuum player game, we get that the phase space should be
, while the players' outcome is an element of R c . Here c is a continuum set. In the mean field game setting we can reduce the phase space of the game to the set of probabilities on T d . Further, since we are seeking for the symmetric equilibrium, the players starting at the same point get the same outcome. Thus, we can index the players by the points of T d i.e. we put c = T d . Simultaneously, given a solution of the mean field game, the expected reward of the representative player depends on his/her initial state continuously. Therefore, the mean field game analog of the value function is the mapping which assigns to an initial time t 0 and an initial players' distribution m 0 a set of continuous functions from T d to R. Each element of this set is a value function for the representative player corresponding to a solution of the mean field game with the initial condition m(t 0 ) = m 0 .
The link between the master equation and the approach developed in the paper is follows. If the function v(t, x, m) solves the master equation for the mean field game, then the mapping (t, m) → {v(t, ·, m)} is a value multifunction in the sense of the paper. However, in the general case we can not restrict our attention to single-valued functions due to the multiplicity of the solutions of the mean field game [5] .
To examine the value multifunction we introduce a family of set-valued mappings Ψ r,s :
is the set of pairs (µ, ψ) such that φ is a reward of the representative player corresponding to a solution of the mean field game on [s, r] with dynamics (1), the initial condition m(s) = m and the payoff functional of each agent given by ψ(x(r)) + r s g(t, x(t), m(t), u(t, x(t)))dt, while the probability µ is the corresponding distribution of agents at the time r. The family of transforms {Ψ r,s } determines a forward dynamics on
Below we call it a mean field game dynamics. Apparently, the notion of mean field game dynamics is close to forward-forward mean filed games studied in [18] .
We prove that if a multifunction is viable with respect to the mean field game dynamics, then this multifunction is a value multifunction. Furthermore, we study the infinitesimal form of the proposed viability condition. We introduce the setvalued derivative of the multifunction V :
by virtue of the mean field game dynamics. The viability theorem proved in the paper states that the multifunction V is viable with respect to the dynamics if and only if the set-valued derivative is nonempty at any point of the graph of V.
The paper is organized as follows. General notation and assumption are introduced in Section 2. Moreover, in this section we give some properties of the dynamics of distribution of players. Section 3 is concerned with the definition of solution to the first order mean field game. In Section 4 we introduce the notion of the value multifunction and formulate the sufficient condition for a given multifucntion of time and probability to be a value multifunction. The condition involves the viability property with respect to the mean field game dynamics. The viability theorem which provides the infinitesimal form of the viability property is introduced in Section 5. The subsequent sections are devoted to the proof of this theorem. Auxiliary lemmas are given in Section 6. The sufficiency and necessity parts of the viability theorem are proved in Sections 7 and 8 respectively.
Preliminaries

General notations
If (X, ρ X ) is a separable metric space, Υ ⊂ X, x ∈ X, then put
Below B(X) stands for the Borel σ-algebra on X. We denote by P(X) the set of all Borel probabilities on X. Further, let P 1 (X) stand for the set of probabilities m on X such that, for some x * ∈ X,
We endow P 1 (X) with Kantorovich-Rubinstein metric (1-Wasserstein metric) defined by the rule: for m 1 , m 2 ∈ P 1 (X),
Here Π(m 1 , m 2 ) is the set of probabilities π on X × X such that its marginal distributions are m 1 and m 2 respectively, i.e.
Lip K (X) denotes the set of K-Lipschitz continuous functions φ : X → R. Note that, if X is compact, then the Wasserstein distance metrizes the narrow convergence.
is measurable, m is a probability of Σ 1 , then denote by h # m the probability on Σ 2 given by the rule:
If (X, ρ X ), (Y, ρ Y ) are separable metric spaces, π ∈ P(X × Y ), then denote by π(·|x) a conditional distribution on Y given x i.e., for each x, π(·|x) is a probability on Y and, for any ϕ ∈ C b (X × Y ),
and (Z, ρ Z ) be separable metric spaces, and let π 1,2 ∈ P(X × Y ) and π 1,2 ∈ P(Y × Z) have the same marginal distribution on Y equal to m. We define the probability π 1,2 * π 2,3 ∈ P(X × Z) by the following rule: for
The probability π 1,2 * π 2,3 is the composition of π 1,2 and π 2,3 . Note that in [1] 
Probabilities on state space and on space of motions
As it was mentioned above, we assume that the phase space is d-dimensional
Notice that the set C s,r C([s, r], 
Denote the set of all measurable functions from [s, t] to
Analogously, let N s,r stand for the set of all measurable functions defined on [s, r] taking values in P 1 (T d × R). We will call elements of both M s,r and N s,r flows of probabilities.
If φ ∈ C(T d ) and ν ∈ P 1 (T d × R), then denote by [φ, ν] the averaging of the function (x, z) → φ(x) + z according to ν i.e.
[φ, ν]
Now let us introduce the notion of concatenations of the probabilities on the set of motions. First, we recall the notion of concatenation of motions. Let s < r < θ. If w 1 (·) ∈ C s,r , w 2 (·) ∈ C r,θ are such that w 1 (r) = w 2 (t), then w 1 (·) ⊙ w 2 (·) is a motion w(·) ∈ C s,θ given by
Define the concatenation of probabilities χ 1 and χ 2 χ 1 ⊙ χ 2 by the following rule: for any ϕ ∈ C b (C s,θ ), 
Dynamics of distribution of players
We assume that the set U and the functions f , g, σ satisfy the following assumptions.
(M1) U is a metric compact; (M2) functions f , g and σ are continuous;
(M4) f and g are Lipschitz continuous with respect to the space variable x and probability m, i.e. there exists a constant L such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
(M5) there exists a constant κ such that, for any
Conditions (M1)-(M5) imply the existence of a constant R such that
Using the relaxation of the control problem for the representative player (see [31] ), we get that his/her dynamics in the extended phase space obeys the following differential inclusion:
Here
An equivalent approach to the relaxation of control problems is based on measurevalued controls [31] . A measure-valued control is a function ξ :
satisfying the following conditions:
• for each t ∈ [s, r], ξ(t, ·) is a probability on U;
• for any ϕ ∈ C(U), the functions
is measurable.
We denote the set of measure-valued controls on [s, r] by U s,r . Notice (see [31] ) that under conditions (M1)-(M5), if (x(·), z(·)) ∈ C s,r satisfies differential inclusion (8), then there exists ξ ∈ U s,r such that, for a.e. t ∈ [s, r],
is absolutely continuous and
Integrating (8), we get that the dynamics of distribution of players in the extended space can be described by the following mean field type differential inclusion
where F (t, w, ν) is defined by the rule
In the general form the notion of solution to the mean field type differential inclusion can be introduced as follows. Definition 1. Let X be a finite dimensional Euclidean space. Further, let G(t, w, ν) be a multivalued function defined on [0, T ] × X × P 1 (X) with values in X. We say that the function [s, r] ∋ t → ν(t) ∈ P 1 (X) solves the mean field type differential inclusion (shortly, MFDI)
if there exists a probability χ ∈ P 1 (C[s, r], X) such that ν(t) is an evaluation of χ at time t, and χ-a.e. w(·) ∈ C([s, r], X) satisfies the differential inclusion
Remark 2. Notice that ν(·) solves mean field type differential inclusion (12) on [s, r] if and only if there exists
Using the same methods as in [30] one can prove the existence of at least one solution to (1) satisfying ν(s) = ν * . Now let us list the properties of the solutions to mean field type differential inclusion (12) . They are proved in the Appendix. Proposition 1. Let ν(·) ∈ N s,r solve (12), and let ν * ∈ P 1 (T d × R) be such that p # ν(s) = p # ν * . Then there exists a flow of probabilitiesν(·) ∈ N s,r such that
is also a solution to (12) .
⊂ N s,r . Assume that, for each i, ν i (·) solves (12) and satisfies ν i (s) = ν * . Then there exist a sequence {i k } and a flow of probabilities ν * (·) ∈ N s,r such that
3 Solution of the first-order mean field game
As it was mentioned in the Introduction, there are several methods to analyze the mean field game (1), (2) . The approach based on PDEs reduces the original problem to mean field game system
Within the framework of this approach a solution of the mean field game is defined as a solution of this system. However, for our purposes it is convenient to use the probabilistic approach. The link between the mentioned approached is discussed in [24] . We adapt the probabilistic approach for the first order mean field game. The following definition is close to one proposed in [4] . Definition 2. We say that a pair (V, m(·)), where V :
is a continuous function and m(·) ∈ M t 0 ,T , is a solution to mean field game (1), (2), if there exists a probability χ ∈ P 1 (C t 0 ,T ) such that
2. V (s, y) is a value of the optimization problem
4. for any s, r ∈ [t * , T ], s < r, and any (x(·), z(·)) ∈ supp(χ),
.
, there exists at least one solution (V, m(·)) to mean field game (1), (2) satisfying m(t 0 ) = m 0 [4] . However, the uniqueness result is not valid in the general case [5] . Now let us introduce the equivalent formulation of Definition 2 using the notion of solution to the differential inclusion. To this end, for s, r
Moreover, B 
Proof. By Remark 2 we have that conditions 1 and 3 of Definition 2 are equivalent to the fact that ν(·) solves (12) and m(s) = p # ν(t). Condition 2 of Definition 2 can be rewritten in the form V (s, ·) = B s,T m(·) σ(·, m(T )). It remains to show that Condition 4 of Definition 2 and Condition 3 of the proposition are equivalent. To prove the first implication integrate condition 4 of Definition 2, for r = T . Thus, using Remark 2, we get
Further, using Remark 1, one can rewrite Condition 3 of the proposition in the form
This and continuity of the functions σ and V imply Condition 4 of Definition 2.
Value multifunction
In this section we introduce the notion of the value multifunction that describes the dependence of the solution of the mean field game on the initial distribution and examine this dependence using the viability approach.
Definition 3. We say that a upper semicontinuous function multifunction V :
is a value multifunction of mean filed game (1), (2) if,
, and φ ∈ V(t 0 , m 0 ), there exists a solution to mean field game (1), (2) (V, m(·)) such that
Remark 3. Note that the value multifunction is not defied in the unique way. It is natural to say that
is the maximal value multifunction if it is a value multifunction and, for any value multifunction V,
The existence result for the maximal value function can be proved using the facts that the closure of union of value multifunctions is also a value multifucntion.
We look for the sufficient condition for a multifunction V :
to be a value multifunction. To this end we introduce the dynamical system on 
We shall show that the family of set-valued mappings Ψ = {Ψ r,s } s≤r provides a dynamics in the space
Here we define the composition of multivalued maps in the usual manner, i.e. if (X, ρ X ) is a metric space, then the composition of multivalued mappings
Proof of Proposition 5. First, let us prove that (14)), we get
Thus, we obtain the inclusion
. There exists χ ∈ P 1 (C s 0 ,s 2 ) such that ν(t) =ê t# χ and supp(χ) ⊂ SOL(s 2 , s 0 , m(·)). Notice that the function φ 0 is a value of the problem maximize
Additionally, one can rewrite (Ψ3) in the form
Using inclusion supp(χ) ⊂ SOL(s 2 , s 0 , m(·)) we conclude that χ is concentrated on the set of optimal motions to problem (15), (16) .
The dynamic programming gives that
It remains to prove that
Let χ i be a projection of χ on
Moreover, since χ is concentrated on optimal motions to (15) , (16), we have that each motion (x(·), z(·)) ∈ supp(χ i ) provides the solution to the problem maximize
Integrating this and taking into account the property supp(χ i ) ⊂ SOL(s i , s i−1 , m i (·)), we get
This implies (17) .
Recall (see the Introduction) that we call the dynamics generated by the family {Ψ r,s } s≤r the mean field game dynamics.
Definition 5. We say that a upper semicontinuous multifunction
is viable with respect to the mean field game dynamics if, for any s, r
• ψ ∈ V(r, µ).
Remark 4. It is more accurate to say that the graph of the multifunction V is viable with respect to the mean field game dynamics. However, for the sake of shortness we will say that the multifunction V itself is viable.
Remark 5. One can prove that the maximal value function is viable with respect to the mean field game dynamics.
The link between viability property and value function is given in the following statement.
Theorem 1. Assume that a upper semicontinuous multifunction
is viable with respect to the mean field game dynamics and V(T, m) = {σ(·, m)}. Then V is a value multifunction.
The proof of Theorem 1 requires Lemmas 1, 2. This Lemmas are concerned with the continuity properties of the propagator B. In the following the constant R satisfies (7).
and (10) holds for x(·) = x 1 (·), z(·) = z 1 (·) and ξ = ξ 1 .
Let (x 2 (·), z 2 (·)) solve initial the value problem for (10) with ξ = ξ 1 and x 2 (s) = y 2 , z 2 (s) = z 1 (s). We have that
Using Gronwall's inequality we get
Further,
Since
Combining this, (18) and (19) we conclude that
The opposite inequality is proved in the same way. Now, we turn to the second statement of the Lemma. Without loss of generality assume that s ′ < s. The semigroup property for the operator B (see (14) ) implies that ϕ(s
Hence,
By the first statement of the Lemma and inequality (11) we have that
This completes the proof of the second statement of the Lemma.
Proof. Let y ∈ T d and let (x 1 (·), z 1 (·)) ∈ Sol(r, s, y, m(·)) be such that
There exists a relaxed control ξ ∈ U s,r ′ such that (10) holds true for
Further, put
We have that
Using Gronwall's inequality, we get
Using (20), we get
Since ψ(x 2 (r)) + z 2 (r) ≤ B s,r m(·) ψ(y), from (20) and (21) we conclude that
Analogously, one can prove that
These two inequalities yield the conclusion of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1. We shall prove that if V is viable with respect to the mean field game dynamics, then, for any t * ∈ [0, T ], m * ∈ P 1 (T d ) and φ * ∈ V(t * , m * ), there exists a solution to (1), (2) (V, m(·)) such that V (t * , ·) = φ * (·) and m(t * ) = m * .
Let N be a natural number, and let t i N t * + (T − t * )/N. By assumption we have that there exists a sequence of pairs {(µ
. By Proposition 1 we can assume without loss of generality that ν 
For s ∈ [t * , T ], set
By Lemma 1 the functions V N are C 1 -Lipschitz continuous functions, where the constant C 1 does not depend on N. Hence, without loss of generality, one can assume that the sequence {V N k } converges to some function V ∈ C([t * , T ] × T d ). Let us prove that (V, m(·)) is a solution of mean field game (1), (2) . To this end we check the conditions of Proposition 4. By construction we have that m(t) = p # ν(t), where ν(·) solves MFDI (12) . Notice that
It follows from (23) that, for any k,
. Using Lemma 2, we estimate the right-hand side of this inequality and get
Passing to the limit when k → 0 and using (24), we conclude that
To this end notice that ν
)). This and the inequalities
Further, the functions x → σ(x, m(T )), x → V (s, x) are Lipschitz continuous with the constants κ and C 1 respectively. Hence, using (27) for N = N k and (5), we conclude
Passing to the limit, we get (26) . The fact that ν(·) is a solution to (12), equalities (22), (25) and inequality (26) imply that (V, m(·)) is a solution of mean field game (1), (2) (see Proposition 4) . Furthermore, by construction m(t * ) = m * and V (t * , m * ) = φ * . Thus, V is a value multifunction.
Statement of the viability theorem
In this section we formulate the infinitesimal form of the viability property for mean field game dynamics.
To this end we use the probabilities on tangent bundles to
Here B c stands for the closed ball of of the radius c centered at the origin. Here F is defined by (9) . For t ≥ 0, let the operator
Finally, for m ∈ P 1 (T d ), denote by m its lifting to
. Now, we turn to the definition of set-valued derivative of the multifunction V at t, m, φ by virtue of F under constraints determined by constant c. We denote this derivative by D c F V(t, m, φ).
satisfying the following properties for ν n Θ τn # β n and m n p # ν n :
Theorem 2. Assume that the upper semicontinuous multifunction
has nonempty values and there exist constants M and C such that, for any t
Then, V is viable with respect to the mean field game dynamics if and only if, there exists a constant c > 0 such that, for any t
Theorems 1, 2 immediately implies the following.
Corollary 1. Let the upper semicontinuous multifunction
where the constants M and C do not dependent on s and m;
• V(T, m) = {σ(·, m)}; Then V is a value multifunction of mean field game (1), (2).
Properties of the "frozen" dynamics
In this Section we present auxiliary statements those are used in the proof of Theorem 2.
For each τ ≥ 0, let Ξ τ be an operator from
is an optimal plan between ν ′ and ν, then 1.
Proof. First, we have that
This proves the first statement of the Lemma. Further, we have that
This inequality yields the second statement of the Lemma.
The following statements are concerned with the continuity of the operator A.
The lemma is proved in the same way as the first statement of Lemma 1.
Proof. First, recall that
Without loss of generality we can assume that s ≤ s ′ . Thus, we have that
This proves the Lemma.
The following lemma provides the comparison of the original and "frozen" dynamics.
Lemma 6. Let m(·) be a flow of probabilities on
Proof. First, by Lemma 5 we conclude that
Let
Using (28), we obtain that there exists a probability ξ ∈ P(U) such that
Consider the motion (x(·), z(·)) satisfyinġ
, and x(s) = y, z(s) = 0. We have that x(t) − y ≤ R(t − s). Thus, for every t ∈ [s, r],
Therefore,
This yields the inequality
The opposite inequality
is proved in the same way. This, (29) and (30) imply the conclusion of the Lemma.
Proof of the viability theorem. Sufficiency
In this section we assume that the upper semicontinuous multifunction V :
has nonempty values, is bounded and, for any t
, the following properties holds true
Here c, M and C are constants that do not dependent on s, m and φ.
We shall prove that V is viable with respect to the mean field game dynamics. The proof is a modification of the proof of the classic viability theorem presented in [2] .
Denote by Z the set of triples (t, ν, φ)
. Clearly, the sets Z and Z n are compacts.
Lemma 7.
There exists a number θ n ∈ (0, 1/n) such that, for any (t, ν, φ) ∈ Z n , one can find (t + , ν + , φ + ) ∈ Z and γ ∈ L c * (ν) such that the following properties holds true for m = p # ν:
4.
Here F defined by (13) .
• |A s,s+2ϑ s,η,ψ µη ψ + s,η,ψ − ψ| < ϑ s,η,ψ /n;
Now define the probability ζ s,η,ψ ∈ P(
Clearly, the projection of ζ s,η,ψ on
is ω s,η,ψ , when its projection on
We have that p # η s,η,ψ = p #ηs,η,ψ and
Analogously, , z) ). • (s
Let E s,η,ψ be a set of triples (t, ν, φ) ∈ Z n such that, for some γ ∈ L c * (m), the following properties hold true:
Now, let us prove that each set E s,η,ψ is open in Z n . Let (t * , ν * , φ * ) ∈ E n s,η,ψ . There exists γ * ∈ L c * (ν * ) such that conditions (E1)-(E5) are fulfilled for (t * , ν * , φ * ) and γ * . Further, let δ > 0, and let (t, ν, φ) ∈ Z n be such that |t * − t| < δ, W 1 (ν * , ν) < δ, φ * − φ < δ. We shall show that, if δ is sufficiently small, then conditions (E1)-(E5) hold true for (t, m, φ) and γ π 0 ν,ν * * γ * . Here π 0 ν,ν * stands for an optimal plan between ν and ν * , while * denotes the composition of probabilities introduced by (3). This will imply that E s,η,ψ is open.
First, notice that, if γ * ∈ L c * (ν * ), then γ = π 0 ν,ν * * γ * belongs to L c * (ν). Further, the condition (E1) holds for (t, ν, φ) if δ < ϑ s,η,ψ − |t * − s|. Since γ * ∈ L c * (ν * ), by Lemma 3 we have that
Therefore, condition (E2) is valid for (t, ν, φ), if
Analogously, by Lemma 5
Therefore, in the case when for (t, ν, φ) .
By (5) we have that |[φ * , ν * ] − [φ, ν]| ≤ (C + 1)δ. Therefore, condition (E4) holds true for (t, ν, φ), if
Thus, by the second statement of Lemma 3 we get
Therefore, if one pick δ less than
then condition (E5) is valid for (t, ν, φ) and γ.
We have proved that if (t * , ν * , φ * ) ∈ E s,η,ψ , then its δ-neighborhood in Z n also lies in E s,η,ψ for sufficiently small δ. Furthermore, by construction (s, η, ψ) ∈ E s,η,ψ . Thus, {E s,η,ψ } (s,η,ψ)∈Zn is an open cover of Z n . Since Z n is compact, there exists a finite number of triples {(s i , η i , ψ i )}
If (t, ν, φ) ∈ Z n , then there exists i = 1, I n such that
. Finally, let γ be such that conditions (E1)-(E5) are fulfilled for (t, ν, φ) and γ.
, then put Λ τ,θ (w, v) be equal to the function t → (w + (t − τ )v).
Assume that s, r ∈ [0, T ], s < r, m * ∈ P 1 (T d ), φ * ∈ V(s, m * ). Put r n r − 1/n. Without loss of generality we assume that r n > s. Now, we construct a number J n , sequence of times {t ) by the rule:
• If t j n > r n , then choose J n to be equal to j. 
We have that φ
Here ⊙ stands for concatenation of probabilities (see (6) ). Sinceê t j n # χ j n =ê t j n # χ j+1 n when j = 1, . . . , J n , the probability χ n is well-defined. Moreover, χ n ∈ P 1 (C s,r ), e t j n # χ n = η j n . Let us point out the properties of the constructed sequences.
n −s)/n, then, using the second statement of Lemma 3 and Lemma 7, we conclude that
Let q n (·) ∈ M s,r be defined by the rule: q n (t) e t# χ n . Notice that q n (t conclude that {χ n } is relatively compact. This means that there exists a sequence {n k } and a probability χ ∈ C 0,T such that
Further, put ν(t) ê t# χ, m(t) p # ν(t), µ m(r). Recall that {φ Jn n } is relatively compact. We can assume without loss of generality that the sequence {φ Jn k n k } converges to a function ψ ∈ Lip C (T d ). By (4) we have that
Additionally, r −t
Jn k n k ) and V is upper semicontinuous, we have that ψ ∈ V(r, µ).
To show that (µ, ψ) ∈ Ψ r,s (m * , φ * ) let us check that ν(·) solves (12) and ν(·), ψ satisfy conditions (Ψ1)-(Ψ3).
To prove that ν(·) is a solution of (12) n . Additionally, let ̟ n (t) ê t# χ n . Notice that q n (t) = p # ̟ n (t). For any w(·) ∈ supp(χ n ), we have that dist w(τ 1 ) − w(τ 0 ), Passing to the limit when k → ∞, using the equality F (θ, p(w(θ)), p # ν(θ)) = F (θ, w(θ), ν(θ)) and convergence (39), we conclude that, for any τ 0 , τ 1 ∈ [s, r], W 1 (q n k (t), m(t)) → 0 as k → ∞.
Finally, convergence of η Jn k n k to ν(r) and Lemma 10 yield (Ψ3). Thus, we prove that (µ, ψ) ∈ Ψ r,s (m * , φ * ). This and inclusion ψ ∈ V(r, µ) (see (41)) implies the sufficiency part of Theorem 2. 
